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Professionalism and the
Volunteer Military

America’s All Volunteer Force: A Success?
Louis G. Yuengert

Abstract: Perhaps the most significant by-product of America’s involvement in Vietnam was the decision to move from conscription
to an all-volunteer force. The Gates Commission recommended this
change, but identified several concerns regarding costs, quality, and
the nature of the force that persist forty years later. This article examines the success of the All-Volunteer Force and its appropriateness for a democratic society

W

hen America committed major combat forces to Vietnam in
1965, the United States had 2.66 million service members on
active duty.1 It was a mixture of professional volunteers, many
of whom had combat experience in WWII or Korea, and conscripted
citizens. At the time, President Lyndon Johnson made the political decision not to ask for authority to call up reserve forces; instead he relied on
the existing armed forces to implement US national policy, augmented by
draft calls, to fill the ranks as the commitment grew.2 This decision and the
violent reaction to the war prompted 1968 Republican nominee Richard
Nixon to promise he would end the draft.3 According to historian Lewis
Sorley, Johnson’s decision and growing anti-war sentiment in the United
States motivated Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams to restructure
the Army in a way that would force future presidents to mobilize reserves
whenever the nation committed to a protracted conflict.4
The past fifty years have brought a dramatic change in the size,
composition, orientation, and professional character of the US military. At 1.31 million, it is just under half the size of the 1965 force and
completely composed of volunteers—though some call it a recruited
rather than a volunteer force.5 US forces are strategically mobile and are
thus expected and trained to conduct operations anywhere in the world
across a wide spectrum, to include humanitarian assistance. Women now
1      Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1965-1966 (London: Institute for Strategic
Studies, March 1966), 23.
2      Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” Parameters 21,
no. 2 (Summer 1991): 35.
3      Donald Vandergriff, Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing
Tomorrow’s Centurions (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 62.
4      Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” 42. Sorley’s claim is
disputed by a lack of direct evidence of General Abrams’ intent.
5      Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request
(Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, February 2015), 21.
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comprise nearly 15 percent of this force, and serve in roles not imagined
in 1965.6 The US Defense Department also created a robust and experienced special operations capability. Finally, and most significantly, the
American military is trained and educated to a level unsurpassed by
any other country’s armed forces. This change took place in an era of
extreme volatility and complexity, one that included the remainder of
the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the first Gulf War, ethnic conflicts
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars. There was an explosion in technological development; specifically, unprecedented advances in the speed of computer processors and
precision-guided weapons. The international political environment
shifted from the relatively stable bi-polar Cold War to what proved to
be a less stable uni-polar world that is developing into a multi-polar
dynamic with even greater uncertainty. Inevitably, the changes also took
place in the context of natural American political and economic cycles.
Many factors influenced the US Armed Forces’ development over these
50 years. This essay focuses on the end of the draft and the institution
of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973.
Two significant questions have accompanied the development of
this military force. Is the All-Volunteer Force a success? A review of
the forty years of experience since its inception suggests that it is. Is an
All-Volunteer Force appropriate for a democratic society? This broader
question defies easy answers, but it is important for all citizens of the
United States to consider.

The Decision to End Vietnam-Era Conscription.

The story of America’s increasing commitment to Vietnam during
the Johnson presidency, the effect of more than 58,000 Americans killed
in action, and the lack of popular support for the war are well known.
Less well known are the events that led to the institution in 1973 of an
all-volunteer military that forms the basis for the US armed forces of
today. The use of the term “all-volunteer” implies America’s armed forces
have normally been manned with conscripted citizens. Throughout the
country’s history, this has not been true. Americans traditionally resisted
the maintenance of a large standing army and relied on volunteers to fill
the ranks of the active military with a robust militia to be mobilized in
times of national emergency. The United States has relied on a draft only
three times: during the mid-later stages of the Civil War, World War I,
and for most of the period 1940-1972.7
In March of 1969, two months after his inauguration, President Nixon
announced the creation of a Commission on an All-Volunteer Force to
fulfill his campaign promise to end the draft.8 Members included former
Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr. as the chairman and such
notables as Roy Wilkins (Executive Director of the NAACP), Milton
Friedman, Alan Greenspan, Jerome Holland (President of Hampton
Institute), and Theodore Hesburgh (President of the University of
6      Eileen Patten and Kim Parker, “Women in the US Military: Growing Share, Distinctive
Profile,” Pew Research Center, December 22, 2011, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/22/
women-in-the-u-s-military-growing-share-distinctive-profile.
7      George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 5-8.
8      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington: US
Government Printing Office, February 1970), vii.
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Notre Dame).9 In 1970, the Commission recommended an immediate
end to conscription and the institution of an all-volunteer military. After
relying on the draft to fill the ranks of its armed forces for the Cold War
for more than 30 years, our defense leaders decided to do something
for the first time in US history, maintain a significant military force
with volunteers instead of draftees. After a lengthy debate, Congress
allowed the statutory authority for the draft to expire.10 The decision was
controversial and despite its recommendation, the commission’s report
identified several concerns involving:
•• the possible mercenary motivation of volunteers
•• the creation of a separate warrior class within the society
•• a greater propensity of political leaders to employ the force
•• the possibility of a disproportionate percentage of volunteers being
from lower economic classes and African-Americans
•• the expense of a recruited military
•• possible quality issues, and
•• opportunity costs associated with expanding personnel expenses
within a fixed defense budget.11
Ironically, even though the all-volunteer force was declared a success
in the 1980s by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, many of these
concerns persist.12

The Success of the All-Volunteer Force

Has the All-Volunteer Force been a success? What defines success
for such a force? Eugene Bardach, a professor at the Goldman School
of Public Policy at the University of California, suggests several criteria
to evaluate policies or programs. They include efficiency (specifically
cost-effectiveness or benefit-cost analysis), political acceptability, and
robustness or improvability.13 He also insists that outcomes be evaluated,
not the policy or program itself. Of these, I will use performance (related
to the most significant outcomes), sustainability (related to robustness)
and cost. An assessment using these measures must compare the current
force to its primary alternative, the conscripted force.
Performance is the most difficult measure to assess. It is impossible to know how well a draftee force would have performed under the
circumstances of the four decades in question. That aside, the US military has been remarkably successful against other conventional military
forces in the last 30 years. This success includes operations in Panama
(1989), Iraq (1991), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).14
While several factors and circumstances led to the collapse of the
9      Ibid., viii-ix.
10      Leonard Wong, From Black Boots to Desert Boots: The All-Volunteer Army Experiment Continues
(Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2014).
11      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 12-20.
12      Mark J. Eitelberg, “The All-Volunteer Force after Twenty Years,” in Professionals on the Front
Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington: Brassey’s, 1996), 66-67.
13      Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem
Solving (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000), 20-26.
14      United States Army Center for Military History, Operation Joint Guardian: The US Army in
Kosovo, CMH Pub 70-109-1 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, September 2007), 3.
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Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, many partially attribute America’s
success in the Cold War to improved military capability.15 Leaving strategic forces (nuclear) aside, since the end of the Cold War, America’s
military forces have been unchallenged at sea or in the air, and rarely
challenged (conventionally) on land. This success has been the result
of the resources the United States spent in pursuit of a powerful military. These include the development and fielding of more sophisticated
combat equipment; e.g. the Abrams tank, the F-22 and the B-2 bomber,
advanced precision munitions, and the construction and operation of
advanced combat training centers like the National Training Center at
Ft. Irwin, California. Currently, US armed forces are ranked as the most
powerful military in the world based on a balance of trained manpower,
quality and quantity of combat equipment, and expenditures on defense
activities.16 Would the US have committed the same resources to training and equipping a draftee force? More significantly, would the nature
of US foreign policy have changed?
Measuring the sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force involves
assessing the ability to recruit and retain the people of the quality necessary to provide the capabilities the nation needs to implement its foreign
policy. The Gates Commission loosely defined “quality” as “mental,
physical and moral standards for enlistment…”17 Within the Armed
Forces, this has come to mean education levels (primarily high school
diploma or equivalent), minimum mental capacity as measured by score
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, absence of a serious criminal
record, and physical ability (minimum fitness level and no disabilities).18
The Gates Commission’s fears about the quality of the armed forces
have generally not been realized.
For a time between the end of the Vietnam War and the early 1980s,
the US military (especially the Army) suffered from a “hangover” effect
in that service in the military was not valued.19 As a result, the military
accepted and did their best to retain lower quality members in order
to fill the ranks. This contributed to low morale, discipline problems,
and, when coupled with poor equipment and training based on lower
budgets, produced what Chief of Staff of the Army Edwin Meyer called
a “hollow Army.”20
The Army’s response to this condition was to change its approach
to war-fighting, training and readiness, convince Congress to boost
soldier pay and benefits, and drastically improve the quality of the equipment and training facilities (discussed earlier).21 Without these changes,
15      Vojtech Mastny, “NATO at Fifty: Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall,”
Foreign Affairs, March 28, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55003/vojtech-mastny/
nato-at-fifty-did-nato-win-the-cold-war-looking-over-the-wall.
16      Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 21-25
17      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 16.
18      Lawrence Kapp, Recruiting and Retention in the Active Component Military: Are There Problems?
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 25, 2002), 2.
19      George C. Herring, Preparing Not to Refight the Last War: The Impact of the Vietnam War on the
US Military in After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2000), 83.
20      Testimony of General Edward C. Meyer before the Subcommittee on Investigations, House
Committee on Armed Forces, May 29, 1980, 18.
21      Anne W. Chapman, Carol J. Lilly, John L. Romjue, and Susan Canedy, A Historical Overview
of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1998 (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office,
TRADOC, 1998), xv-xvi; and Wong, From Black Boots to Desert Boots.
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successful operations in Panama and Iraq (1991) would not have been
possible. The resultant strategic success in the Cold War led to a period
of downsizing for the military, the harvesting of a “peace dividend,” and
a reflection on the relevance of the military in the absence of the global
Soviet threat.
In the decade prior to September 2001, the military was reduced
in size by almost 37 percent and largely brought home to the United
States from Europe.22 For the all-volunteer force, this meant a balanced
approach that included a reduction in accessions (enlistments and officer
commissions) and a combination of voluntary and involuntary incentives
for career soldiers to leave the force. The effect of this was an increase
in quality of the smaller force as the services were more selective in
who they enlisted and retained.23 A by-product of this drawdown was
the transfer of experienced soldiers and leaders into the Reserves and
National Guard, improving the quality of those forces as well.
However, the economic boom in the mid-to-late 90s, coupled with
an end to the drawdown that resulted in an increase in enlistment quotas,
created a period where the military struggled to recruit the number of
quality soldiers necessary to fill its ranks.24 The real test for the AllVolunteer Force came in the years after the 9-11 attacks. In the initial
years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military services were able
to meet both their quality and quantity goals for recruiting. Nonetheless,
by 2005, they were hard pressed to recruit enough soldiers of the desired
quality.
According to a 2013 Congressional Research Service report, this
shortfall happened for a variety of reasons: the difficulty of recruiting
during wartime, an upturn in the economic conditions in the US, and,
in the Army and Marine Corps, an expansion of the recruiting mission
in an effort to grow the size of the force to meet operational requirements.25 When the mission in Iraq started to wind down, the expansion
of the force was completed and the severe economic downturn took
hold in 2008-09, the services began to meet recruiting goals once more.
In the four to five years since then, the planned reduction in the size of
the armed forces has made for an easier recruiting and retention environment, resulting in a high quality force.26
In general, other than two periods of time, the quality of the AllVolunteer Force has been very high. An increase of over 100 million
people to the US population with a corresponding dramatic decrease in
the size of the military, sizeable increases in pay, an insistence on high
school graduates and higher test scores, the introduction of women into
the ranks in much greater numbers (15-20 percent) and extensive use
of enlistment and retention bonuses have allowed the services to select

22      Bernard Rostker, Rightsizing the Force: Lessons for the Current Drawdown of American Military
Personnel, Working Paper (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2013), 13.
23      Lawrence Kapp, Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2011 and FY2012 Results for Active
and Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 10,
2013), 4.
24      Ibid., 15.
25      Ibid., 4.
26      Ibid., 5.
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their members more carefully from among the population.27 The ability
to sustain this quality force over time is a significant measure of its
success as compared to a conscripted military force.
The most compelling argument against the success of the allvolunteer military is that it is unaffordable. In 1967, Milton Friedman
addressed this issue by stating the hidden tax imposed on those young
men who were drafted would be replaced with an explicit tax on society,
thus exposing the real cost of defense. He also argued reduced costs
would result from longer enlistments and less required training.28 While
this projection represented increased government expenditures (by initially 3-4 billion dollars a year in his estimation), it effectively reduced
the overall costs which included the hidden tax on draftees.
The Gates Commission argued the increased taxes required to
maintain the military would spur a broader debate about defense spending and the use of the military.29 While Friedman and others included
direct compensation in their calculations and analysis, they either did
not anticipate or did not address indirect costs resulting from efforts to
maintain an effective force in the face of changing demographics. These
include increases in retirement costs for a recruited force more likely to
make the military a career, the housing, family program and health care
costs for a force more likely to be older and married, the direct cost of
recruiting infrastructure and advertising, and the costs associated with
increased usage of benefits like the Army College Fund and the GI Bill.
In the last decade alone, the costs per active duty member of the
Armed Forces increased 46 percent.30 If current spending trends continue, personnel costs could consume the entire DOD budget by 2039.31
At the macroeconomic level, however, US defense spending was almost
20 percent of all government spending in 2008 (at the height of spending
for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) compared to 45 percent in 1968 at
the height of the Vietnam War.
As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), military spending decreased from 9.4 percent to 4.6 percent over the same time period.32
While this is an academic discussion given the current budget environment, the reality is the level of defense spending is a matter of priorities,
federal taxation and spending policy. The significantly increased personnel costs in maintaining an all-volunteer military are undeniable.
If Friedman is correct, however, this is just the actual cost of providing for the nation’s defense, paid for explicitly by its taxpayers and not as
an implicit tax on draftees. The relevant question is whether the United
States is willing to pay the bill. If not, then the choices include reductions
in military strength and capability, changes in military compensation or
benefits, or both.
27      US Census Bureau, “American Fact Finder,” http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_13_5YR_B01003&prodType=table; and Institute
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 21-25.
28      Milton Friedman, “The Case for Abolishing the Draft—and Substituting for it an AllVolunteer Army,” New York Times Magazine, May 14, 1967, 117.
29      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 152.
30      Dennis Laich, Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2013), 10.
31      Ibid.
32      Karl W. Eikenberry, “Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force,” The Washington Quarterly 36, no.
1 (Winter 2013): 12.
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As a result of this discussion, a reasonable conclusion is the AllVolunteer Force has been a success. The US military has performed
admirably over the past four decades by most measures and America
has shown a willingness to sustain its military over that time period.
Whether the cost of this force is worth the benefit gained is, rightfully,
always being debated.

Is a Volunteer Force Appropriate for a Democratic Society?

The Gates Commission raised several issues regarding the effect of
the All-Volunteer Force on American society: possible mercenary motivations of recruits, development of a separate warrior class within the
society, possible disproportionate representation of African-Americans
in the force (resulting in a greater proportion of casualties), and a greater
propensity to employ military force by the political class. A subject not
addressed by the commission was the effect of this change on one
specific group, women. In the limited space of this essay, all of these
will be addressed except the African American issue. While the specific
concern about casualties has never been realized, the complexity of the
discussion and its place in American society’s dialog on race requires its
own essay. As scholar Beth Bailey noted: “In a democratic nation, there
is something lost when individual liberty is valued over all and the rights
and benefits of citizenship become less closely linked to its duties and
responsibilities.”33
Related to the question of mercenary motivation, and the creation of
a “warrior class,” is the issue of whether all citizens should be committed
to securing the liberties of a democratic society, not just committed to
paying someone else to secure them.
Beth Bailey’s quote above can be viewed as a warning about the
majority of American citizens avoiding this responsibility and duty to
protect liberty by allowing volunteers, generally from the economic
lower classes, to provide that protection while they are shielded from
a draft. During the deliberations of the Gates Commission, members
considered a statement made years earlier by noted economist, John
Kenneth Galbraith:
The draft survives principally as a device by which we use compulsion to get
young men to serve at less than the market rate of pay. We shift the cost of
military service from the well-to-do taxpayer who benefits by lower taxes to
the impecunious young draftee. This is a highly regressive arrangement that
we would not tolerate in any other area. Presumably, freedom of choice here
as elsewhere is worth paying for.34

In effect, deciding to recruit an all-volunteer force was also a decision to compete fairly in the workforce marketplace. As such, monetary
incentives have played a critical role in the recruiting strategy of the US
Armed Forces over the years.
The decision to proceed with an all-volunteer force prompted
Congress to immediately increase pay for enlistees by 61.2 percent as an
33      Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 260.
34      Walter Y. Oi, “Historical Perspectives on the All-Volunteer Force: The Rochester
Connection,” in Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, DC:
Brassey’s, 1996), 46.
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enticement to join. This incentive, combined with rising unemployment
at the time, resulted in a seemingly positive start for the experiment.35
However, the replacement of the GI Bill in 1977 with a less generous
program, concerns among career enlisted soldiers about pay equity, and
subsequent pay increases capped below private sector wage increases
resulted in low quality soldiers and an exodus from the services of midgrade officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).36 As the decade
closed, the all-volunteer force experienced declining enlistments, an
element of soul-searching as the military sought relevance post-Vietnam,
lower quality soldiers, rising attrition and declining morale.37
The 1980s saw a renewed commitment to the all-volunteer force.
Double-digit, across-the-board pay raises in 1981 and 1982, an early
decade recession and highly successful recruiting campaigns (like the
Army’s “Be All You Can Be”) helped the services begin to meet desired
quality goals. Introduction of programs like the Army College Fund and
the return of the GI Bill in 1984 helped in the recruitment of high school
graduates looking for options to fund their college education.38
This influx of higher quality soldiers allowed the military to adjust
its retention standards so it could separate those with lower test scores,
the less educated, drug users, and malcontents. An emphasis on physical
fitness and weight control also improved the health and overall fitness
of the force. These improvements, coupled with increases in spending
on modern equipment and training, and tactical successes in Grenada,
Panama and Iraq improved the morale, standing and reputation of the
force.
In the 1990s as America substantially reduced the size of the military resulting in a need for fewer recruits, monetary incentives were
less important to meeting quality goals. After the 9-11 attacks, the US
Department of Defense made decisions that significantly increased the
total compensation of its service members to sustain the military during
the long years of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.39 These included substantial increases in enlistment and retention bonuses between 2005 and
2008 as the services struggled to meet recruiting quotas.40
Does this evidence indicate the creation of a mercenary force? Are
monetary incentives the main factor in successfully recruiting the high
quality young people needed to make this force effective? While many
of the incentives used to recruit and retain service members are monetary, the primary reason (88 percent) cited in a 2011 Pew Survey by
post-9/11 veterans for joining the military was “to serve their country.”
The second most common reason (75 percent) cited was “to receive

35      Wong, From Black Boots to Desert Boots.
36      Gary R. Nelson, “The Supply and Quality of First Term Enlistees Under the All-Volunteer
Force,” in The All-Volunteer Force after a Decade (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 25.
37      Wong, From Black Boots to Desert Boots.
38      Ibid.; and Maxwell R. Thurman, “On Being All You Can Be: A Recruiting Perspective,” in
Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996),
56-61.
39      US Congressional Budget Office, “Costs of Military Pay and Benefits in the Defense
Budget,” November 2012, 16.
40      Laich, Skin in the Game, 65.
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education benefits.”41 This was consistent with an earlier report (1987)
published by the World Congress of Sociology about youth motivation
for military service that listed “chance to better myself” as the number
one reason for enlisting.42 These survey results indicate that monetary
benefits have a role in recruitment but that they are not the primary
reason for choosing to serve.
These data mitigate the concern about mercenary motivations
somewhat. An alternative narrative is the Armed Services are competing
in the marketplace with a combination of pay and benefits and messages
regarding opportunities for self-improvement, patriotic service to the
nation, and inclusion on a values-based, winning team.
On the question of a separate warrior class, there is genuine concern
regarding a divergence in values between the small portion of the US
population that serves in the military and the society the military serves.
In some ways, serving in the military has become “a family business,”
with children and grandchildren of career military members being more
prone to military service than other citizens.43
Additionally, our civilian political leaders are unlikely to have
military service on their resume. The percentage of veterans serving in
Congress has dropped from (77 percent) in 1977 to (20 percent) today.
This corresponds to an overall drop in the number of veterans in the
population from 13.7 percent to 7 percent.44
The implications for civilian control over the military are significant. Resistance by the military establishment to major policy changes
generally supported by the US population (repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” and combat exclusion policy, for example) can be attributed in
part to this divergence in values.45 While the military eventually bows
to the direction of its civilian masters due to strong cultural norms and
an understanding of constitutional civilian control, the resistance sows
distrust and tension between military and political leaders. A lack of
military or national security experience on the part of political leaders
can lead to a form of blackmail by military leaders and those who
support them, pressuring politicians to acquiesce to military opinion
through use of public and private media or the Congress. The more
experience political leaders have in these areas, the less susceptible they
are to this blackmail.
The third concern expressed by the Gates Commission pertained to
whether political leaders might be more prone to commit troops to military action if they were volunteers. From 1973 to 1989, the US national
41      Pew Research Center, “War and Sacrifice in the Post 9/11 Era,” October 5, 2011, Chapter 3,
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/10/05/war-and-sacrifice-in-the-post-911-era.
42      Paul A. Gade and Timothy W. Elig, Enlisting in the US Army: The Citizen Soldier in an All
Volunteer Force (Munich: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut Der Bundeswehr, 1987), 33-41.
43      V.A. Stander and L.L. Merrill, The Relationship of Parental Military background to the Demographic
Characteristics of 11,195 Navy Recruits, Naval Health Research Center Report No. 00-14 (San Diego,
CA: April 2000), 4.
44      Drew Desilver, “Most Members of Congress have Little Direct Military Experience,”
Pew Research Center, September 4, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/04/
members-of-congress-have-little-direct-military-experience.
45      Craig Whitlock, “Marine General Suggests Repeal of “Don’t Ask” Could Result in
Casualties,” Washington Post, December 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/14/AR2010121404985.html; and Kori Schake, “Women Soldiers Confront
not just Enemy, but a Range of Political Issues,” in Strategika, Hoover Institution, June 1, 2013,
http://www.hoover.org/research/women-soldiers-confront-not-just-enemy-range-political-issues.
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security establishment was focused on the Cold War struggle with the
Soviet Union. The threat of major military conflict with the Warsaw Pact
may have suppressed the urge to engage in the use of force in pursuit
of other national interests. In the period since the end of the Cold War
and breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the absence of this suppressant may
have contributed to two decades of what could be called US military
adventurism (Iraq-1991, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq2003, Libya).
Although there is no direct correlation between the number of military operations in this period and the advent of the all-volunteer force,
the increase after the end of the Cold War calls into question whether
this factor had a bearing on decisions to commit US armed forces. As an
illustration, the US deployed forces 19 times in the draft years between
1945 and 1973. Since the end of the draft, the Unites States engaged
forces overseas 144 times.46 If this pattern continues after the United
States withdraws combat troops from Afghanistan, it might be reasonable to conclude that American leaders see fewer political consequences
to employing all-volunteer military forces than they would while using
conscripted forces. This outcome would certainly be a significant negative consequence of having an all-volunteer military.
The discussion of these three issues raises serious concerns about the
strict use of volunteers to fill the ranks of our military. While mercenary
motivations seem to be less of a problem, the existence of a “warrior
class” in society and the possibility elected officials will be more prone
to use the volunteer force should spark meaningful debate about the
composition of the US military.

Women in the All-Volunteer Force

The experience of women in the All-Volunteer Force and the subsequent expansion of opportunities for them is worth specific mention.
The significant changes in policy and attitude toward women in the
Armed Forces began with implementation of the All-Volunteer Force.
Since 1972, the percentage of women serving in the military has increased
from 1.9 percent to 11 percent in 1990, to 14.6 percent in 2012.47 The
implications of this dramatic increase were not considered by the Gates
Commission because it assumed the percentage of women in the force
would continue to be capped at 2 percent and women would remain in
clerical, administrative and medical specialties.48
In 1972, however, the realization of an inability to recruit a highquality force due to a shrinking population of qualified men, prompted
then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to develop a task force “to
prepare contingency plans for increasing the use of women to offset possible shortages of male recruits…”49 By 1976, the number of women in
46      Eikenberry, Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force, 10.
47      US General Accounting Office, Composition of the Active Duty Forces by Race or National Origin
Identification and by Gender (Washington, DC: February 1991), 1-4; and US Department of Defense,
2012 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Communities and Family Policy,
2012), 19.
48      The Report of The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 82.
49      Central All-Volunteer Task Force, Utilization of Military Women (Washington, DC: Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, December 1972), i.
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the military had more than doubled and they could be assigned to all but
“combat-associated specialties.”50 During that period, some institutional
barriers were lifted that inhibited opportunities and restricted roles for
women. These included:
•• Allowing women to command mixed-gender units
•• Allowing women to enter aviation training and military academies
•• No longer requiring the discharge of pregnant women or those with
minor dependents
•• Equalizing the family entitlements for married men and women51
Looking back, these changes signaled the existence of significant
cultural and legislative barriers that women had to overcome. The most
significant impediment to their advancement was the combat exclusion
policy that barred women from positions with the likelihood of direct
physical contact with the enemy. This policy initially flowed from a 1948
legislation restricting women in all services except the Army (there were
specific Women’s Army Corps restrictions in place already) from assignment to aircraft or ships that were engaged in “combat missions.”52
By 1987, the statute had been amended and the service policies had
evolved to allow women to be assigned to all but selected specialties
where the likelihood of direct combat or capture by enemy forces was
high.53 For military women, this progress was encouraging but painfully
slow. The excluded specialties were those, culturally, afforded the most
respect and most important to career advancement.54 In some cases
where statutory restrictions did not exist, service policies still restricted
their range of assignments based on a probability of being involved in
direct combat.55
In all of the services, these restrictions resulted in fewer opportunities for women and acted as an obstacle for advancement and promotion
to senior rank. As doctrine and organizing principles changed over time
and the services realized there was inherent inconsistency in these policies (e.g. there were some women who were excluded from positions due
to likelihood of direct combat while others were in positions where they
were exposed to enemy fire), a steady erosion of the combat exclusion
took place. The deployment of over 40,000 women to support the first
Gulf War in 1991 heightened public awareness of the role of military
women.56 In 1992, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
repealed the limitations on the assignment of women to combat aircraft.57 Similarly, the 1994 NDAA repealed the ban on assignment of
women to combat ships and the Army opened attack aviation positions
50      Martin Binken and Mark J. Eitelberg, “Women and Minorities in the All-Volunteer Force,” in
The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 85.
51      Ibid., 85-86.
52      US General Accounting Office, Combat Exclusion Laws for Women in the Military, Testimony of
Martin Ferber (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, November 19, 1987), 2.
53      Ibid., 4.
54      Ibid., 4-6.
55      Ibid., 8.
56      US Department of Veterans Affairs, America’s Women Veterans: Military Service History and VA
Benefit Utilization Statistics (Washington, DC: US Department of Veterans Affairs, National Center
for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, November 23, 2011), 3.
57      United States Congress, National Defense Authorization Act, amendment to sections 8549 and
6015 of Title 10 US Code, section 531, sub-para. (a) and (b), December 5, 1991.
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to women. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the twenty-first century
featured the continuous exposure of women to enemy fire and capture,
in spite of the policy excluding them from direct ground combat.
In March 2011, a Military Leadership Diversity Commission created
by the 2009 NDAA recommended the combat exclusion policy be
eliminated, women in career fields already open to them be available for
assignment to any unit, and the services and DoD take “deliberate steps
in a phased approach” to open career fields and units involved in “direct
ground combat” to qualified women.58 In January 2013, Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta made the announcement of the rescission of the
combat exclusion policy.59 This opened another chapter in the integration of women into the armed forces that is still on-going. After the
military services conducted the “deliberate steps in a phased approach”
recommended by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission with a
focus on the ability of women to meet the physical demands of the specialties involved, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter opened all military
positions to women in January 2016.
Arguably, the advent of the All-Volunteer Force changed the discussion of women’s roles in the military. In order to find enough volunteers
of the appropriate quality to fill the ranks, the Department of Defense
had to include more women in the recruiting pool. To recruit and retain
those women, it had to give them opportunities for success and advancement. This led to changes in policy and a much slower change in culture
that has paralleled the society’s changing view of the role of women in
the workplace.

Conclusion

One of the legacies of the Vietnam War is the all-volunteer military
force. It has proved resilient in the face of US involvement in conflict
across the world, budget reductions, economic prosperity and stagnation, demographic changes in the makeup of the force, and changes in
social policy and attitudes. A return to conscription and the resulting
effect on American society seem unimaginable.
I have tried to answer two fundamental questions about the choice
America made in 1973. Has the All-Volunteer Force been a success? And,
is an All-Volunteer Force appropriate in a democratic society? However,
several other fundamental questions persist. Is the all-volunteer military
representative of our society and its values? Does its existence allow
our citizens to avoid the hard discussions about the use of military
force in pursuit of national objectives? Is the burden of service borne
disproportionately by members of the lower economic classes? What
costs are American taxpayers willing to bear to sustain the excellence of
this force? All US citizens should contemplate the implications of these
questions as the country struggles to make decisions about the size and
nature of the armed forces.

58      David F. Burrelli, Women in Combat, Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, November 8, 2011), 7.
59      Claudette Roulo, “Defense Department Expands Women’s Combat Role,” US Department
of Defense press release, January 24, 2013.

